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Abstract
This paper proposes a new test of Tiebout sorting that relies on the ex-
ogenous time structure of recurrent local elections. The test is based on the
idea that competitive elections represent periodic perturbations to the Tiebout
equilibrium of local public good provision and allocation of households to com-
munities, so that their schedule should a¤ect the timing of householdssorting
decisions. On the other hand, internal migration ows that have nothing to do
with the demand for public goods over which localities vote recurrently ought to
be orthogonal to the timing of elections in a reduced-form migration equation. I
exploit the staggered schedule of mayoral elections in Italy to analyze migration,
elections, and public budget data across several thousands of municipalities, and
nd evidence of a systematic inuence of the electoral calendar on the timing
of sorting decisions.
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1 Introduction
The idea of mobile households sorting across localities according to their prefer-
ences for public services, or voting with their feet(Tiebout, 1956), has played
an inuential role in theoretical and applied work in urban economics for decades
(Oates, 2006). However, to what extent Tiebout sorting mechanisms actually
achieve an e¢ cient provision of local public goods and an optimal allocation of
households to communities has been shown to depend on circumstances includ-
ing the availability of Lindahl pricing in environments of heterogeneous commu-
nities (Ross and Yinger, 1999) and the objective function of local jurisdictions
(Jehiel and Lamy, 2018). From an empirical point of view, the role of local
public goods in inuencing householdsinternal migration decisions besides the
well-established push and pull factors from labor market conditions remains
unclear (Dowding et al., 1994). Part of the scepticism about the practical rele-
vance of Tiebout sorting seems to be due to model specication and estimation
di¢ culties: identifying the e¤ect of decentralised scal policy on householdslo-
cation decisions has proved problematic, and thwarted by endogeneity, reverse
causality, and measurement issues (Kumino¤ et al., 2013).
In fact, the rare circumstances where the provision of local public goods
changes exogenously in a quasi-experimental setting are increasingly seen as the
ideal conditions for testing the key predictions of the Tiebout model in terms
of capitalization of public amenities into property values and stratication of
communities via direct migratory responses.1 Banzhaf and Walsh (2008) use a
di¤erence-in-di¤erences approach to test whether the entry and exit of polluting
facilities have an impact on population density (through the number of individu-
als leaving and entering a community) and mean incomes (changing mix between
richer and poorer households) of evenly-spaced constructedneighborhoods in
California, and nd evidence of out-migration and impoverishment of communi-
ties when the public good air quality deteriorates. Chay and Greenstone (2005)
and Greenstone and Gallagher (2008) use quasi-experimental approaches to eval-
uate the welfare impact of mandated federal environmental policies on US local
governments, and provide evidence of capitalization of environmental quality
1Epple and Sieg (1999), Epple et al. (2001) and Sieg et al. (2004) estimate general
equilibrium models of sorting across a nite number of xed-boundary communities where
endogeneity of community-specic amenities arises because the unobserved component of local
public goods might be correlated with housing prices and household expenditures, and use
functions of the income rank of communities as instruments. The earlier approaches to testing
the Tiebout sorting hypothesis are reviewed in Ross and Yinger (1999).
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into housing values in hedonic price models that allow for individual preference-
based self-selection to locations. Rhode and Strumpf (2003) test instead the
long-run Tiebout prediction that the secular decline in mobility costs should in-
crease preference heterogeneity and policy variation across communities. They
nd no support for those hypotheses on samples of US municipalities and coun-
ties, thus challenging the view that community choice be primarily driven by
Tiebout incentives. Borge et al. (2014) exploit a partial scal decentralization
reform in Norway that allowed greater local discretion in the use of public re-
sources, and nd higher responsiveness of the local public sector to local demand
as well as more intense population sorting after the reform. On the other hand,
a recent and growing literature focuses on the impact of discrete changes in local
income taxation schedules on the location decisions of high-income taxpayers,
generally uncovering large elasticities of internal migration ows to local income
tax policy di¤erentials (Schmidheiny and Slotwinski, 2015; Basten et al., 2017;
Martinez, 2017; Moretti and Wilson, 2017; Agrawal and Foremny, 2019).
This paper puts forward a novel, reduced-form test of the Tiebout sorting
hypothesis that relies on the staggered time structure of local elections as an ex-
ogenous and recurrent perturbation to the equilibrium allocation of households
to communities. The test is built on the idea that since periodic competitive
elections have an impact on the provision of local public services, the calendar
of local elections should inuence the timing of sorting processes. At the same
time, internal migration ows that have little to do with the consequences of
elections in terms of local public service provision should not be a¤ected by the
timing of local races.
The idea that the periodicity of elections can have an inuence on the tra-
jectory of aggregate economic variables (output, unemployment, ination, and
nominal exchange rates) and of public policy (public expenditure, taxation, and
regulatory measures) has a long tradition in economics.2 Nordhaus (1975) was
the rst to formally argue that the fact that the government be chosen in peri-
odic competitive elections(Nordhaus, 1975: 185) can induce incumbent politi-
cians to exploit nominal rigidities and votersnaivety (myopia, adaptive expec-
tation formation, and retrospective voting) and manipulate short-term macro-
economic trade-o¤s to engineer political business cycles of low pre-election
unemployment followed by after-election ination. Rogo¤ (1990) later provided
2Drazen (2001) reviews the voluminous theoretical and empirical political business cycle
literature that appeared in the previous quarter century.
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a rational, dynamic signaling interpretation of the observed e¤ect of election
schedules on the economy, pointing to the strategic timing of scal policy by
competent politician types trying to separate from incompetent types by switch-
ing to more salient public consumption expenditures and away from investments
right before the elections (political budget cycles). Starting with Rosenberg
(1992), a strand of the subsequent literature investigated the presence of such
cycles on the larger number of observations that are found in local government
data, as in the recent empirical analyses of Akhmedov and Zhuravskaya (2004),
Baleiras and Da Silva Costa (2004), Veiga and Veiga (2007), Dahlberg and Mork
(2011), Foremny and Riedel (2014) and Englmaier and Stowasser (2017).
In practice, testing whether the timing of elections has an inuence on the
timing of household sorting requires high-frequency internal migration data and
an exogenous structure of decentralised government elections. The former makes
it possible to monitor the trajectory of migration rates in the vicinity of the
date of the election, and the latter allows an interpretation of the election date
in a given locality as a randomly assigned treatment. I rely here on a large
dataset of Italian municipalities (the about 7,000 local authorities - Comuni -
located in continental Italy) and exploit the availability of monthly municipal-
level migration data along with the staggered schedule of mayoral elections
occurring every fth year. In particular, I analyze the trajectory of migration
in the proximity of the three largest election waves of the past two decades
involving about 4,000 municipalities and taking place on June 12, 2004, June 7,
2009, and May 26, 2014. Importantly, I can use the set of authorities not holding
an election during those years (around 3,000 municipalities) as the control group
in a di¤erence-in-di¤erences approach, where the electoral treatment can be
taken as quasi-randomly assigned due to the fact that the causes of the staggered
election schedule date back several decades.
The results of the empirical analysis can be briey summarised as follows.
First, di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimation on monthly migration data around
those three large elections provides evidence that the timing of municipal elec-
tions inuences the timing of householdsmigration decisions. After accounting
for seasonality of the sorting process and using the municipalities that do not
hold elections in those years as the control group, average migration rates in
the months following the date of the election turn out to be around four to ve
percent higher than in the months preceding the date of the election in the local-
ities that actually held municipal elections, with the estimated e¤ect standing
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a number of robustness checks on di¤erent samples and model specications.
Second, I investigate a number of potential mechanisms linking the timing of
electoral events with householdsmigration choices. After excluding that the
evidence can be explained by mere political uncertainty, actual election results,
fraudulent behavior on the part of incumbent governments aiming at maximizing
pluralities, or technical reasons such as lags in votersregistration mechanisms,
I test the hypothesis that the impact of the electoral schedule on the timing of
household sorting is the consequence of a political budget cycle, i.e., fabrication
of favorable economic conditions and implementation of generous spending and
transfer policies right before the elections, followed by after-election austerity.
To test this hypothesis, I employ a large panel dataset of yearly municipal budget
and migration data spanning through two decades of Italian mayoral elections.
The yearly panel data results reinforce the evidence of an election-driven cycle
of sorting, with out-migration rates rising and in-migration rates falling sharply
in the years following municipal elections. Moreover, I nd that two key in-
dicators of local government policy (the municipal budget surplus/decit as a
percentage of total current revenues and the local income tax rate) follow a time
pattern that is compatible with a political budget cycle paradigm and exert a
signicant impact on out-migration and in-migration ows, thus pointing to
the political budget cycle induced by the electoral schedule as the most likely
structural cause of the observed time pattern of sorting.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 illustrates the
institutional framework and the dataset of Italian municipalities. Section 3
analyzes the reduced-form impact of local election schedules on the timing of
sorting, while section 4 tests a number of hypotheses about the mechanisms
linking the timing of elections with the timing of sorting. Finally, section 5
concludes.
2 Institutional framework and dataset
The municipal level of government in Italy is made of over 8,000 authorities,
with average population size of around 7,000 inhabitants and more than half
the localities counting less than 3,000 residents. Irrespective of their size, all
municipal authorities are statutorily responsible for the provision of services in
two main areas.3 The rst area concerns environment-related services, and in-
3The sole exception is the possibility for small-sized municipalities to set up a exible
intermunicipal cooperation agreement or a formal institutional arrangement for the provision
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cludes: public transportation systems; road maintenance, cleaning, and police;
waste collection and management; water and sewer services; parks and green
spaces; environmental monitoring, regulation and protection; planning and zon-
ing policy (including the location of new productive plants); and management
of infrastructures located within their boundaries. The second area concerns
welfare-related services and includes: social care to elderly, physically disabled,
drug and alcohol addicts, and mentally ill people (residential, community, and
domiciliary care); services to families with dependent children (organization and
management of pre-school/kindergarten services); help to lone-parent house-
holds, abused women, foreign immigrants and refugees (counselling, mediation,
and advocacy); and nancial assistance to homeless and indigent people (so-
cial housing; rent subsidies; food, health, and transport vouchers; unconditional
one-o¤ or periodic cash transfers).
While average annual per capita spending on municipal public services amounts
to about euro 1,200, or almost 5% of GDP, the inter-municipal variance in the
range and quality of services provided is enormous, particularly as far as welfare-
related expenditures are concerned. In fact, EU, state and regional grants only
cover about 13 of spending on local welfare services, leaving municipal govern-
ments an ample degree of discretion. For instance, childcare services having a
crucial role in female labour force participation according to the o¢ cial Europe
2020 headline target strategies vary dramatically across municipalities, with a
rate of formal enrollment of children aged 0-3 into nurseries ranging from less
than 5% to over 50%, and municipal spending per child from less than euro
100 to over euro 3,000 (ISTAT, 2016). Similarly, while Italian municipalities
spend on aggregate over half-billion euro per year on policies aimed at ghting
poverty and social exclusion, less than half authorities o¤er a domiciliary social
assistance service, and only about 14 of them have a formal youth training and
subsidised employment program (ANCI, 2016). Indeed, this suggests that the
impact of municipal policies - in particular the structure, variety and intensity
of welfare services - on the quality of life of households and on their location
decisions can be substantial.
In fact, internal mobility has been a distinctive trait of contemporary Italian
history. After a phase of soaring migration ows along the North-South gradient
between the 1950s and 1970s due to the enormous economic gap between the
of public services that require a minimum scale of production (e.g., water and sewer services,
or residential care homes). Services requiring a larger scale are provided by either of the two
upper tiers of local government (120 Provinces and 20 Regions) or by the national government.
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two areas of the country, the geographic pattern of migration has changed con-
siderably in the most recent years: internal mobility fell between the early 1980s
and the mid 1990s in spite of persisting interregional disparities and even rising
unemployment rate di¤erentials (Faini et al., 1997), to eventually increase again
in a rather impressive way during the past two decades (Biagi et al., 2011). In
2014, total internal migration ows involved over 1.3 million people, an almost
20% larger gure than twenty years earlier, and long-distance or disequilibrium
migrationows from the poorer South to the more urbanised and developed
Centre and North of Italy continue. Interestingly, though, the largest number
of inter-regional moves in the most recent years have occurred within the North
of Italy, and more than 60% of all internal migration episodes are represented
by short distance within-province relocations (Buonomo and Gabrielli, 2016;
Accetturo et al., 2019).
As for local elections, all Italian municipalities have direct election of the
mayor every fth year in a single or dual ballot depending on resident population
size, with larger localities (>15,000 inhabitants) having a runo¤ stage among
the two most voted candidates if none gets more than 50% of the votes in the
rst stage. The seats in the local council are assigned to the parties or lists
supporting the mayoral candidates on a proportional basis, with a majority
premium guaranteeing that the list supporting the elected mayor gets at least
60% of the council seats. Voting in mayoral elections is formally mandatory
for all aged above 18 and average voter turnout is as high as 80%, though no
sanctions exist for abstainers (Revelli, 2016).
The empirical analysis uses data on the about 7,000 localities that are situ-
ated in the fteen state lawcontinental Italys regions (83 provinces) and thus
exclude the ve regions (the two islands Sardegna and Sicilia, and the three small
alpine regions Valle dAosta, Trentino-Alto-Adige, and Friuli-Venezia-Giulia)
that are entitled to larger autonomy (home rule) and establish own limits and
regulations on the municipal governments that are located within their bound-
aries, and where household mobility tends to be constrained by geographical and
linguistic barriers. Table 1 reports the number of elections taking place during
the period 2002-2014, showing that the largest fraction of municipalities voted
in 2004 (June, 12), 2009 (June, 7), and 2014 (May, 26). Thanks to this overlap-
ping schedule, I can identify the e¤ect of election dates separately from common
inuences on migration propensities due, say, to national politics, demography,
or macroeconomic conditions. Importantly, since the staggered structure of the
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schedule dates back several years or even decades (Repetto, 2018), I can take
it as exogenous. In particular, I focus on the years 2004, 2009, and 2014, when
elections were held in over 4,000 Italian municipalities (treated sample), using
the almost 3,000 authorities not having elections in those years as the control
group. Migration data limitations prevent me from using earlier years than the
2004 election wave.
I use municipal-level monthly population data so as to be able to observe
the trajectory of migration through the months preceding and following the
date of the election. All data used are o¢ cial gures provided by the Italian
National Statistics Institute (ISTAT). Using monthly migration data at the
municipal level comes at the cost, though, of not having information on movers
destination: such information is available at the regional level only, thus allowing
the construction of bilateral migration matrices at no lower than the inter-
regional level. Basically, for each municipality and during every month I observe
the total number of new registrations and the total number of cancellations from
the municipal list of residents.4 Monthly rates of out-migration and in-migration
are around 0.3%, as shown in table 2.
Table 2 reports a further number of characteristics of the authorities in the
treated and control samples, including the size of municipal population (ob-
served on a monthly basis) and its age structure (observed on a yearly basis).
First, the authorities holding elections in those three years tend to have smaller
population and larger shares of mature residents than the authorities not holding
elections. In order to account for these observable di¤erences between the two
groups, I report estimates of the e¤ect of the electoral schedule on the timing of
migration from specications that use demographic characteristics as controls.
A second feature of the data emerging from table 2 is that the number of au-
thorities holding elections declines over time. Part of this phenomenon is due
to episodes of redistricting and mergers of municipalities taking place between
2009 and 2014 and causing a fall in the total number of observations. Since
those boundary changes can be considered as virtually mandated by the central
government, they do not constitute a source of bias. For the most part, however,
the decline is due to early termination of local legislatures leading to mayoral
4 In addition, monthly migration data do not contain separate information on internal versus
foreign migration ows (dalla Pellegrina et al., 2018). However, the annual municipal-level
migration data that report this information show that foreign migration ows are of modest
size relative to internal ones. I make use of annual data on internal migration ows in section
5 below.
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elections before the expected end of the ve-years term of o¢ ce. About 300 of
the 4,317 municipalities having elections in 2004 had the subsequent election
before the end of the regular term (that is, between 2005 and 2008). Similarly,
more than 300 of the 4,081 authorities holding elections in 2009 had an early
election in the next four years. In general, an early election is required if the
mayor dies, resigns, or is no longer backed by a majority of the council mem-
bers. In addition, the Ministry of Interior can command anticipated elections
if a council passes unlawful acts or excessive decits. In order to rule out the
possibility that our estimate of the e¤ect of the timing of elections on the timing
of sorting be driven by shocks a¤ecting both the chance of holding an election
in one of those years and resident householdswillingness to move, Appendix
A reports estimates on datasets that only include authorities holding elections
after a regular ve-years term of o¢ ce.
3 The timing of elections and internal migration
I rst investigate whether the schedule of mayoral elections has an inuence
on the timing of households migration decisions by means of di¤erence-in-
di¤erences estimation of a reduced-form migration equation on monthly panel
data. The exogeneity of the staggered electoral calendar allows me to take the
presence of a mayoral election in a locality in a given year as a quasi-randomly
assigned treatment, and use the set of authorities not holding elections as the
control group. Figures 1, 2, and 3 plot the migration rate trajectories in the
vicinity of the election dates of 2004, 2009, and 2014. The upper portion of
each gure reports the average monthly rates of migration (out-migration plus
in-migration monthly ows as a percentage of resident population in a munici-
pality on the rst day of the month) in the group of localities holding an election
() versus the average monthly rates of migration in the group of localities not
holding an election () in each of the January to May (pre-election) and June
to October (post-election) months.5 The lower portion of the gures shows the
corresponding average monthly di¤erence in migration rates between the two
groups (), thus removing the seasonal aspects of migration that are apparent
from the upper portion of the graph, such as the migratory peaks in early Spring
and late Summer that seem likely to be attributable to retirees (snowbirds)
5Appendix A reports empirical evidence based on narrower time windows around elections
(up to two months), while section 4 performs a similar analysis on annual migration data over
a long panel dataset (2002-2014).
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and students moving for reasons that are unrelated to local elections.
The time pattern of migration that emerges from those gures is intriguing,
and is remarkably consistent across the three election waves. First, migration
rate trajectories in the treatment and control groups track each other closely
in the pre-election months, o¤ering no evidence of di¤erential pre-treatment
trends in the variable of interest depending on treatment status. However, they
diverge visibly in the subsequent months, compatibly with the hypothesis of
an e¤ect of the presence of a mayoral election on the timing of migration in
treated relative to control localities, with a particularly striking break in the
spell immediately following (one to two months) the date of the election. As
far as the 2004 and 2009 elections are concerned, the average growth in the
rate of migration between the pre-election month (May) and the post-election
month (June) in the treated authorities is almost twice as large as the one in the
control authorities, and the di¤erence gets even larger in the subsequent month.
As for the 2014 election, the average growth of the migration rate from May
2014 to June 2014 in treated authorities (about 20%) is three times as large as
in control group authorities (less than 7%), a gap that slightly decreases in the
following months.
To formally test the impact of the timing of local elections on the trajectory
of migration rates, I estimate a reduced-form migration equation for each of
the three years (equation (1) below) that includes month dummies t (t 2
T = fJanuary; :::;Octoberg), a binary group membership indicator ei 2 f0; 1g
taking value 1 in all localities having an election in late May/early June of that
year, and the interaction of the group indicator with a dummy variable equaling
1 for observations in the ve months following the election (June to October):
mit = t + ei + 
 
ei  1

t 2 T + i + "it (1)
where T = fJune; :::;Octoberg. The panel structure of the data is captured by
the time-invariant municipality-specic component i, and "it is assumed i.i.d.
The dependent variable mit is measured as the sum of the inow and outow
of individuals from municipality is list of residents during month t, expressed
as a percentage of resident municipal population on the 1st day of the month.
I estimate equation (1) by OLS after taking deviations from municipal means,
thus removing all time-invariant components. The estimation results are re-
ported in table 3. The rst line in table 3 shows baseline results of the speci-
cation in equation (1), while the second line includes the demographic size of
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localities as control. In all instances, the key coe¢ cient  is estimated to be
positive and statistically signicant. Holding an election raises migration by up
to 5% relative to the baseline average monthly migration rate.
To verify the robustness of this result, Appendix A rst reports (table A.1)
estimates of equation (1) on samples that only include authorities holding elec-
tions after a regular ve-years term of o¢ ce, with estimated s that are virtually
identical as the ones in table 3. Second, table A.2 in Appendix A reports the
estimation results of equation (1) when employing time windows that are closer
to the date of the election (8, 6, 4, and 2 months). The estimated coe¢ cient on
the post-election dummy  remains statistically signicant across the di¤erent
time spans in all years, averaging between 0:02 and 0:03, or an about 4% to 5%
excess rate of migration in the post-election months in the authorities holding
elections. As gures 1 to 3 suggest, the estimated  coe¢ cient generally tends
to increase in size and signicance as the observation window narrows down. Fi-
nally, to rule out the possibility that the di¤erent trajectories in the treated and
control groups be due in reality to underlying seasonal di¤erences in migration
patterns between the small and mostly rural localities in the treatment group
and the larger and more urbanized ones in the control group, table A.3 reports
analogous estimates as in table A.2 for the subgroup of localities having elections
in 2003, 2008, and 2013, using the localities not having elections in those years
(with the exclusion of the municipalities that constituted the treated group in
2004, 2009, and 2014) as the control group. The results in table A.3 using this
alternative treatment group are remarkably similar to the ones in table A.2.
The estimated coe¢ cient on the post-election dummy is always positive, and
it averages again around 0:3. As in the core sample, the  coe¢ cient grows in
size and signicance as the observation window around the date of the election
narrows down.
4 Discussion
The results in section 3 above point to a signicant impact of the schedule of
the elections on the timing of migration. However, such empirical evidence is
in principle compatible with a number of distinct mechanisms linking electoral
events with householdsmigration choices. Four such mechanisms are discussed
in what follows. The rst mechanism that might be responsible for the de-
lay of migration to after the election is political uncertainty, in particular the
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idea that new information on the local public goods that will be provided and
on the taxes that will be imposed in the future can be acquired by waiting
and procrastinating the migration decision until after the elections, when un-
certainty will be resolved. The second is related to the possibility that the
actual electoral outcome rather than electoral uncertainty per se be responsi-
ble for post-electoral migration ows, that would therefore crucially depend on
whether the incumbent gains re-election or not. The third has to do with can-
didatese¤orts at maximizing votes, and in particular with their attempts at
mobilizing non-resident supporters to ctitiously relocate in order to register as
eligible voters where elections are held. The fourth and nal mechanism that
I consider refers to the opportunistic behavior of incumbent governments engi-
neering a political budget cycle of pre-electoral expansionary scal policy and
post-electoral austerity.
4.1 Electoral uncertainty
Recent empirical research has found a number of dynamic business decisions to
be systematically inuenced by the timing of elections irrespective of purposeful
policy, or even in the opposite direction as what traditional political business
cycle models of opportunistic policy-making would predict (Canes-Wrone and
Park, 2012; Baker et al., 2016; Colak et al., 2017; Jens, 2017). In the presence of
political uncertainty induced by competitive elections (regarding, for instance,
what kind of taxation, privatization, and labor-market regulation policies will
be implemented by the newly elected government), domestic corporate capital
expenditures and foreign direct investments across a large number of countries
facing parliamentary or presidential elections appear to drop signicantly be-
fore the election and stagnate until after it, when political uncertainty is re-
solved (Julio and Yook, 2012; 2016).6 Such incentives for procrastination of
large investments with high costs of reversal (e.g., building a new plant) would
partly o¤set any concomitant attempt of opportunistic election-year manipula-
tion of public budgets, or even generate a reverse electoral business cycleof
pre-electoral stagnation, and would explain the limited empirical support for the
conventional political business cycle hypothesis (Canes-Wrone and Park, 2012).
Similarly, one could see the migration decision as an investment: the decision
6The theoretical foundations of this line of investigation can be traced back to the models of
irreversible investment of Cukierman (1980), Bernanke (1983), and Rodrik (1991). Following
a similar approach, Giavazzi and McMahon (2012) document e¤ects of electoral uncertainty
on householdsprecautionary savings.
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to move involves up-front xed costs that are to some extent irreversible, it is
taken in an uncertain environment where new information can be acquired by
waiting, and it is postponable, in the sense that the potential migrant can either
keep the valuable option to procrastinate, or kill it by exercising it (Burda, 1995).
The fact that new information on the local public goods that will be provided
in the future can be acquired by waiting and delaying the migration decision
until after the elections, when uncertainty will be resolved, would give rise to a
voting and sorting cycle, with residents that are in principle willing to move in
search of the public services they require (e.g., schooling for their children, or
care homes for their elderly relatives) delaying their exit decision (Hirschman,
1970) to after the election.
Testing this hypothesis requires a proxy of the degree of uncertainty about
the policy that will be enacted by the new government in the next term. In the
absence of ideal ex ante measures of uncertainty that are continuously registered
during the term leading to the election, I rely on indicators that have been
widely employed in the literature and are computed on: a) ex post data from
the election of interest; b) data from previous elections in the same municipality;
c) data from elections that have taken place during the previous term of o¢ ce
for overlapping tiers of government (Fiva and Natvik, 2013).
First, I employ the win margin of the mayor in the coming election, i.e.,
the di¤erence in votes between the elected mayor and its most voted opponent,
as an ex post indicator of closeness of the race. To have comparable gures
across municipalities, the win margin is standardised by expressing the absolute
di¤erence in votes as a percentage of the total votes cast. This way, the closeness
of the race index lies between 0 and 100.7 In the 2004 election wave, 4,006
races were contested by at least two candidates, and the mean and median win
margins were 20.8% and 16.9%. In 2009, with 3,770 contested elections, mean
and median win margins were 20.2% and 16% respectively. Finally, in the 3,201
contested elections held in 2014, the mean and median win margins were 23.1%
and 16.6% of the votes. Overall, the win margin was less than 3 percentage
points in 10% of the elections, it was less than 1 12 percentage points in 5% of
the elections, and it was less than 0.3 percentage points in about 1% of the
elections. Almost 30 races in those three election waves ended in exact ties and
required supplementary rounds.
7The rst round outcome is considered in the few cases where the election has a run-o¤
stage.
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Table 4 reports the estimation results of a migration equation that includes
the above indicators of electoral uncertainty in each of the three election waves.
The rst three columns use dummy variables that equal 1 if the vote margin
between the elected mayor and the most voted opponent is less than 0:3 per-
centage points, 1 12 percentage points, and 3 percentage points, interacting them
with the after-election dummy. In all cases, the post-election dummy for the
authorities actually voting remains of the same size as before and statistically
signicant, pointing to an excess rate of post-election out-migration from munic-
ipalities facing an election at the midst of the period relative to municipalities
where no election takes place of about ve percent. However, the estimated co-
e¢ cients on the interaction terms are not statistically signicant, thus o¤ering
no evidence of an impact of electoral uncertainty on the timing of migration
besides the presence of a mayoral election per se.
Second, given that ex post indicators su¤er from an endogeneity problem
due to the fact that the ex ante and usually unobserved degree of uncertainty
a¤ects voter turnout and the latter a¤ects the outcome of the election (Shachar
and Nalebu¤, 1999), I use proxies of uncertainty from previous electoral rounds
where available (elections of 2009 and 2014). In particular, the fourth column
of table 4 employs a binary indicator based on the rate of voter turnout in the
previous mayoral election (2004 and 2009 respectively) as a predictor of the de-
gree of uncertainty in the coming election. In this case too, the indicator taking
value 1 if turnout exceeded 80% in the previous election (roughly correspond-
ing to the 10th percentile of the turnout distribution) is not estimated to a¤ect
the timing of migration decisions beyond the sheer presence of an election in a
municipality. Similar (unreported) results emerge when using other uncertainty
indicators related to outcomes or voter participation in the previous elections.
Finally, the last column of table 4 reports the estimation results when using
a proxy of uncertainty from the Senate elections that were held in Italy the year
before the mayoral elections of 2009 and 2014. In particular, I build a dummy
variable that equals 1 if the vote margin between the candidate that is elected
Senator and its opponent in a winner-takes-all race at the provincial level is less
than 1:5 percentage points.8 However, estimation of this specication (as well
as specications based on other proxies of electoral uncertainty from the Senate
8Admittedly, the closeness of the Senate race might not be an appropriate predictor of
the closeness of a mayoral race in this context given that races for the Italian Senate tend
to have a partisan dimension (typically, a competition between candidates from the national
right-wing and left-wing parties) that is less explicit or common in municipal elections.
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elections) fails to return any signicant impact of uncertainty on the timing of
migration.
Overall, the results in table 4 conrm that the schedule of elections a¤ects
the timing of migration signicantly, but they provide no evidence of a specic
inuence from the indicators of electoral uncertainty that we have employed. In
fact, the post-election rise in migration rates occurs irrespective of the degree
of uncertainty that characterises the election, at least as we have been able to
proxy it. One possible explanation for this result is that the out-migration and
in-migration ows that I have treated jointly in a single variable respond in a
di¤erent way to the incentives generated by a jurisdictions political climate.
In particular, out-migrants might have better information about the candidates
and the degree of uncertainty of the next mayoral race in their jurisdiction of
residence than potential in-migrants. To see whether this is the case, gures 4 to
9 depict the distinct trajectories of out-migration and in-migration rates in the
vicinity (10-months window) of the three election dates. Similarly to gures 1
to 3, the upper portion of each gure reports the average monthly rates of out-
migration/in-migration (monthly population outows/inows as a percentage
of resident population in a municipality on the rst day of the month) in the
group of localities holding an election () versus the average monthly rates
in the group of localities not holding elections () in each of the January to
May (pre-election) and June to October (post-election) months. The lower
portion of the gures shows again the corresponding average monthly di¤erence
in out-migration rates (gures 4-6) and in-migration rates (gures 7-9) between
treatment and control groups ().9
Consider the path of out-migration in gures 4-6 rst: similarly to overall
rates of migration, monthly out-migration rates in the treatment and control
groups almost overlap in the pre-election months. However, their trajectories
are considerably di¤erent after the date of the election, with treatment group
localitiesgures signicantly exceeding control group localitiesones. Figures
4 to 6 reveal in particular that the growth in out-migration rates between the
pre-election and post-election months in the treatment group is far larger than
in the control group (from over twice as much in 2004 and 2009 to almost four
9Figures 7 to 9 show that the average rates of in-migration in the localities holding an
election tend to be systematically higher than in control localities. This is due to fact that
the localities holding elections tend to be smaller (table 2) and are located in the regions of
the North of Italy, and those regions are net recipients of migrants.
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times larger in 2014). On the other hand, the picture emerging from gures 7
to 9 referring to in-migration rates is altogether di¤erent. There seems to be no
evidence of immigrants postponing their moving decisions to after the elections
in the group of authorities actually facing them. Rather, the average di¤er-
ence in in-migration rates between the treatment and control samples shows a
tendency to decline in the post-election months.
Table 5 reports the estimation results of equation (1) when using out-migration
and in-migration rates as the dependent variable in each of the three election
years. As far as the out-migration equation is concerned, it turns out that
authorities facing a municipal election towards late May/early June register sig-
nicantly higher rates of out-migration in the months following the election. On
average, and given monthly rates of out-migration of about 0.3%, the estimated
coe¢ cients in the rst row of table 5 suggest that holding an election provokes an
increase in out-migration during the post-election months of almost 10%, with
the estimate slightly declining over time. Conversely, no such e¤ect emerges
from the second row of table 5 as far as in-migration rates are concerned. The
impact of the election even turns out to be negative and statistically signicant
at the 5% and 10% level in the years 2009 and 2014 respectively. Finally, in or-
der to ascertain whether uncertainty has a di¤erential impact on out-migration
versus in-migration ows, I employ all indicators of uncertainty that I have used
above in the distinct equations for out-migration and in-migration rates. As far
as these electoral uncertainty proxies are concerned, though, tables 6 and 7 show
that they do not play any role in either.
4.2 Election outcomes
An alternative mechanism that could explain the role of elections in migration
decisions refers to the actual changes of government that occur at elections.
In particular, the dependence of the timing of internal migration ows on the
electoral schedule might originate in environments of politically unstable juris-
dictions that are stuck in inferior congurations in terms of equilibrium policy
choices and allocation of citizens to localities, and where the ousting of the in-
cumbent in one of them constitutes the shock that is transmitted to the system
and allows it to break out through citizens re-sorting and eventually attaining
a higher level of aggregate welfare (Kollman et al., 1997).
An ideal test of this hypothesis requires well-dened partisan races in un-
stable political environments, where the periodic occurrence of an incumbent
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losing to an opponent of a di¤erent ideology is followed by a policy reversal that
can credibly bring about a new allocation of households to communities after
the election. In the context we are dealing with here, the fact that incumbent
mayors are labelled as non-partisan in about 23 of the elections (though most
of the times they are de facto linked to a political party, union, or interest
group) makes a test of this hypothesis admittedly problematic. More gener-
ally, though, the trajectories of out-migration and in-migration rates that we
observe in the vicinity of elections seem virtually orthogonal to actual electoral
outcomes: when building a dummy variable that equals 1 at an election where
the incumbent mayor loses to an opponent that is supported by a coalition of
a di¤erent nature - i.e., a left-wing mayor losing to a right-wing or to a non-
partisan candidate, or vice versa, a category of events occurring in less than 20%
of all elections of 2009 and 2014 - and interacting that dummy variable with the
usual election month indicator, I get no evidence that the size of the migration
ows occurring during the months following the date of the election depends
on whether the incumbent gained re-election or not, thus casting doubts on the
relevance of a political-instability mechanism in explaining the impact of the
electoral schedule on the timing of internal migration decisions.
4.3 Fictitious relocations
Third, it has been suggested in other contexts that incumbents might purpose-
fully alter the number of resident voters right before the date of the election in
order to enhance their chances of re-election. This could occur, for instance, if
mayors could convince partisan voters residing elsewhere to register for voting
in jurisdictions having a close election to tilt it in their favour. In this regard,
Fukumoto and Horiuchi (2011) test whether the combination of weak registra-
tion requirements for voting in Japanese municipal elections (simply submitting
a form, even through a delegate) and an asymmetric electoral schedule might in-
duce candidates to mobilise non-resident supporters to ctitiously register there.
They adopt an election timing as treatmentapproach similar to the one that I
employ here, and use municipality-month panel data around the April 2003 mu-
nicipal election round in Japan to nd that the treatment (having an election)
has a signicant impact on the number of relocations taking place before the
election in a locality. To be fair, that mechanism seems unlikely to be at work
in the context we analyze here. Electoral registration requirements in Italy are
rather strict: registering to vote in an Italian municipality involves starting in
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person a formal and rather time-consuming administrative process of change of
residence. Importantly, proofs of actual relocation must be provided, and are
subject to local police review. Since such strategy is costly, we would expect
to see it in place only where uncertainty plays a major role and the incumbent
runs the risk of being unseated, something that the evidence above allows us to
rule out.
A potentially relevant related issue is that the lists of residents might be
updated with a lag for technical reasons that have little to do with the actual
timing of householdsresidential choices. However, any change of residence that
is initiated by an Italian citizen in a given municipality by submission of a
formal request implies immediate cancellation from the list of residents of the
community of origin and the simultaneous new registration in the municipality
of destination. This means that a request of change of residence becomes im-
mediately e¤ective for all purposes (most importantly for what concerns local
tax dues or rights to, say, domiciliary assistance or housing benets), with the
possibility on the part of the municipal government of destination to declare
the act null and start a prosecution if the relocation turns out to be ctitious
(in fact, ctitious relocations tend to work as a means of tax avoidance rather
than as an attempt at inuencing the outcome of an election). In addition, if a
technical lag issue was really at work, it would indeed a¤ect both in-migration
and out-migration ows, and in the same direction.
4.4 The political budget cycle
Finally, one might wonder whether the inuence of the electoral schedule on the
time pattern of internal migration is due in reality to the fact that municipal
policies are manoeuvred strategically by opportunistic incumbent governments
and tend to follow a political budget cycle, with spending and budget decits
rising and taxes falling right before the elections, and restrictive scal austerity
measures being postponed to after the elections. This implies, rst, that poten-
tial out-migrants might nd it protable to postpone exit to after the elections
that are scheduled in their municipality of residence in order to fully take ad-
vantage of the generous pre-electoral policies and avoid paying their deferred
price (higher local taxes and lower levels of public services in the aftermath of
the elections). At the same time, the restrictive policies that governments need
to implement at the start of their term of o¢ ce would create the least favorable
conditions for entry after an election.
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In fact, and in addition to the literature reviewed in the introduction docu-
menting the widespread opportunistic use of scal policy by local governments
around the world, recent empirical contributions by Alesina and Paradisi (2017),
Bonfatti and Forni (2017) and Repetto (2018) show that Italian municipal gov-
ernments strategically manoeuvre policy tools. Alesina and Paradisi (2017)
exploit the introduction of a new municipal property tax in the early 2010s and
the staggered electoral schedule to demonstrate that local governments impose
lower tax rates if they face an election in the subsequent year. Bonfatti and
Forni (2017) document that Italian municipal governments set higher levels of
public spending, particularly as far as investment spending is concerned, and
provoke a general deterioration of public budgets when they make their scal
decisions close to the next elections. Repetto (2018) reports evidence of electoral
cycles in municipal investments on roads, parks and public housing, and nds
that dissemination of nancial information has the e¤ect of smoothing those
cycles.
Given that the existing budget-making constraints on Italian local govern-
ments require their key scal policies to be set before December 31st of each
year and to hold for the subsequent calendar year, I employ here an yearly panel
dataset to test the hypothesis that the electoral calendar inuences the timing
of out-migration and in-migration ows through changes in municipal scal pol-
icy. The panel dataset includes the same 7,000 continental Italys municipalities
studied above, but it spans through over a decade (years 2002-2014), for a total
of almost 90,000 annual observations on internal migration ows and municipal
scal policy instruments. The time period considered here saw the Italian econ-
omy move from moderate economic growth in the early 2000s to a deep and
prolonged recession during the late 2000s and the early 2010s, and the average
annual internal migration rates show a moderate increase over the decade, from
below 2.5% to close to 3%.
First, in order to verify if the pattern of election-driven migration that was
observed on monthly data emerges on annual data too, table 8 reports the
results of estimation of reduced-form out-migration and in-migration equations
(equation (2) below) in a similar spirit as the monthly-level equation (1). Given
the ve-years electoral term, the municipalities in this dataset face two to three
elections during the period of observation (table 1), and equation (2) lets the
yearly percentage rate of out-migration (subsequently, in-migration) from (to)
locality i to (from) any other Italian locality in year t (Mit) be a function of the
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distance of year t from the year of the next election in locality i (dit):
Mit = (dit) + hi + yt + it (2)
I start with a linear measure of distance from elections, (dit) = 

1
4 ( it   t)

,
with  it as the rst election year in municipality i following year t, and nor-
malization of the measure having the only scope of easing interpretation of the
coe¢ cient (Berdejó and Yuchtman, 2013). This formulation makes the distance
from the next election range from 0 in the year of the elections to 1 in the rst
year of a regular ve-years term, and imposes the e¤ect of election distance on
out-migration (in-migration) to be captured by a single parameter (). Next,
I model the e¤ect of the timing of municipal elections on the timing of migra-
tion in a more exible nonlinear way through a vector of four dummy variables
e(t   l)it that equal 1 if there was an election in the l = 1; :::; 4 calendar years
preceding the migration measurement year t in municipality i:
(dit) =
4X
l=1
le(t  l)it (3)
A problem that might be caused by the use of annual data at the municipal
level is the inuence on migration rates of correlated macroeconomic conditions
across the country and their cyclical uctuations. To account for such macro-
economic conditions potentially a¤ecting all municipalities in a similar way,
equation (2) includes xed year e¤ects (yt) that can be identied separately
from the e¤ects of the elections (parameters l) thanks to the staggered na-
ture of the electoral schedule. Finally, I control for locality-specic unobserved
time-invariant traits via municipal xed e¤ects (hi), while it is an i.i.d error
term.
I report the within-group estimates of the reduced-form models for out-
migration and in-migration rates in table 8. The rst column reports estimates
of the  coe¢ cient on the linear measure of distance. As for out-migration, the
estimated coe¢ cient is an highly signicant +0:047 (standard error = 0:011).
Given an average annual out-migration rate of about 2:7%, this means that the
rate of out-migration during the year immediately following an election year is
almost 2% higher than at the end of the electoral term. As for in-migration,
the estimated  coe¢ cient is negative (meaning that moving from the beginning
of an election cycle to the end of term one can expect in-migration to rise),
somewhat larger in absolute value ( 0:060), and highly statistically signicant
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(standard error = 0:014). In relative terms, the e¤ects are smaller than the ones
obtained from the ner observations on monthly data, probably due to the fact
that using annual observations implies renouncing to the action taking place
within a year in the vicinity of the date of the election.
The next column of table 8 reports the estimation results from a specication
having a one-year lagged election dummy - e(t   1)it = 1 if the migration rate
is measured the year after a municipal election in municipality i is held, 0
in any other year of the electoral cycle - while the subsequent columns keep
on adding further lagged election year dummies for up to an election having
taken place four years back. In all of those specications, it turns out that the
timing of elections signicantly inuences the trajectory of migration out of a
municipality. In particular, out-migration is estimated to be higher in the year
following an election and, to an even larger extent, in the subsequent year. The
estimates including dummies for three and four years after an election reveal
that the rate of out-migration reverts to the average in the third year, and turns
signicantly negative in the fourth year, that is the year corresponding to the
eve of the next election in a regular ve-years term of o¢ ce. Similarly to the
linear distance model, these estimates suggest that the out-migration rate is
almost two percent larger in the post-election year than in the pre-election one.
The estimation results for the in-migration equation are reported in the lower
panel of table 8, and point to a clear election-driven pattern too. However, sim-
ilarly to the results obtained when using a linear distance measure, in-migration
rates appear to respond to the calendar of municipal elections in the opposite
way as out-migration rates. The smallest of all rates of entry that are registered
during an electoral cycle is observed in the post-election year. In the subse-
quent years, the in-migration rate keeps on increasing and reaches its maximum
in the election year, when it is over 3% larger than in the post-election year.
Figure 10 depicts the out-migration and in-migration trajectories between two
elections that the estimation results from the last column of table 8 (full set of
distance-from-election dummies) suggest to be typical.
Overall, the reduced-form estimates based on this large yearly panel dataset
seem compatible with a political budget cycle of incumbent governments cre-
ating a favorable scal climatebefore the elections and postponing restrictive
policies that discourage in-migration and favor out-migration to after the elec-
tions. In order to ascertain the plausibility of this interpretation of the observed
migration patterns, I employ two indicators of local scal policy that are avail-
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able for the period 2006-2014 and can be viewed as fundamental signals of local
governmentsbudgetary choices having an impact on householdswelfare. The
rst is the yearly budget surplus (or decit) as a percentage of total current mu-
nicipal revenues. After adhering to the EU Stability and Growth Pact (1997),
Italy adopted a set of internal scal rules (known as the Domestic Stability Pact)
that were aimed at extending scal discipline to all subnational levels of govern-
ment in order to ease coordination and attain the EU-wide consolidated scal
targets. The rules restraining local government decit spending are approved
yearly by the Italian Parliament and have shown considerable volatility over
time, from limits on issuance of new debt to caps on expenditures and explicit
targets on local scal gaps (municipal spending net of interest outlays minus own
revenues), generating some confusion and opacity in central-local scal relation-
ships. To enforce these rules, central government imposes penalties in terms of
grant cuts and hiring limits on non-complying authorities (Grembi et al., 2016).
Basically, deviations from the balanced budget rule can only be temporary, and
scally distressed authorities need to commit to a budget consolidation plan.
In the panel dataset that we employ here, the median budget surplus is 0.12%,
corresponding to a virtually balanced budget, but its variance is considerable,
with the largest decit amounting to almost -10% and the largest surplus to
over +20%.10
The second indicator I use is the income surcharge rate that Italian mu-
nicipalities can impose since the year 2000 on personal income on top of the
progressive tax rate structure set by the national government. While the im-
pact of income taxes on taxpayerslocation decisions is well documented in the
literature as far as federal countries are concerned (Schmidheiny, 2006), the
scal decentralization wave of the recent decades has contributed to make it
a salient issue in unitary countries too (Agrawal and Foremny, 2019). At the
time of its introduction, the municipal surcharge was a at rate of up to 0.8%
to be applied on personal income. Starting from 2011, local authorities have
been given the chance to establish a progressive income surcharge too within
the ve income tax brackets set by central government. About 13 of municipal
authorities switched from a proportional to a progressive tax structure in the
subsequent years, with marginal tax rates ranging from around 0.4% in the low-
est to 0.9% in the highest tax bracket. While the ensuing interjurisdictional tax
10Local government budgets are available for the years 2006-2014 (ISTAT, Indicatori di
bilancio e del personale).
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rate di¤erentials are not overwhelming, they tend to be perceived as signals of
the more general municipal scal strategy and might therefore have an impact
on taxpayersbehavior and location decisions.
Figure 11 reports the trajectories of these two scal variables between sub-
sequent elections. In particular, for the income tax I use the municipal mar-
ginal tax rate on mean per capita income (euro 20,000). Each  represents the
point estimate (along with its 95% condence interval) of the coe¢ cient on the
lagged election dummies (l) in equations (2)-(3), where the budget surplus as
a percentage of current revenues and the local income tax rate are employed
as dependent variables respectively. The estimated l coe¢ cients in gure 11
point to time patterns of those policy variables that are compatible with a po-
litical budget cycle paradigm. The budget surplus signicantly improves in the
years following an election year. Afterwards, it starts progressively deteriorating
until the next election. Similarly, the local income tax rate sharply increases
in the year following an election year, and then falls during the entire term of
o¢ ce, touching its minimum level in the year the next election is held. I em-
ploy these two variables to perform a direct test of the impact of local scal
policy on the trajectories of out-migration and in-migration rates, and exploit
once more the exogeneity of the staggered electoral schedule by using the set of
distance-to-election dummy variables e(t l)it as instruments. The instrumental
variables estimation results of this model are reported in table 9, and point to
a signicant impact of those scal variables on interjurisdictional sorting ows.
Out-migration from a locality rises and in-migration into a locality falls signi-
cantly when the government of that locality puts restrictive scal policies (larger
budget surpluses and higher local income tax rates) in place. The Sargan test on
the instruments fails to reject the null of instrument validity in both equations.
Of course, I cannot exclude that part of the e¤ect that I have estimated be due
to the fact that the two variables that I have used are correlated with aspects of
local policy-making that cannot be observed and have an impact on households
location decisions by contributing to the scal climate of a locality, such as the
quality of public services or the employment opportunities in the local public
sector.
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5 Concluding remarks
This paper has designed and run a test of Tiebout sorting that relies on the
staggered time structure of local elections as a recurrent exogenous perturbation
to the equilibrium allocation of households to communities in a system of local
governments. I have rst employed monthly data on municipal-level migration
rates around the three largest waves of Italian local elections of the past two
decades (June 12, 2004, June 7, 2009, and May 26, 2014) to test the hypothesis
that the timing of elections has an inuence on the timing of migration decisions.
The empirical analysis employs a di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimation approach
using the fact that around 4,000 municipalities are treated, in the sense that
they hold elections in those three years, while the about 3,000 municipalities not
holding elections in those years due to the staggered election schedule act as the
control group. Average migration rates in the months following the date of the
election are estimated to be up to ve percent higher than the respective gures
in the months preceding the date of the election in the localities that actually
hold elections. If we take this gure as an estimate of the actual fraction of
the moving population that does so in a Tiebout-like fashion, it is of the same
order of magnitude as typical estimates from countries like the US (Banzhaf and
Walsh, 2008), where household mobility is usually believed to be signicantly
larger (Molloy et al., 2011).
Next, I have explored a number of mechanisms that could potentially be
responsible for the impact of the electoral calendar on the timing of internal
migration decisioins. I nd a number of proxies of electoral uncertainty to
have insignicant e¤ects on the timing of migration decisions, and inspection
of the distinct trajectories of out-migration and in-migration rates reveals that
the former rise and the latter tend to fall after mayoral elections, and in neither
case are either electoral uncertainty or actual election results estimated to play a
role. After excluding that the impact of the timing of elections on sorting can be
explained by technical reasons (mechanical delays in registration) or fraudulent
behavior (ctitious relocation), I test the hypothesis that opportunistic budget
cycles of pre-electoral scal expansion and post-electoral austerity be responsible
for the observed migration trajectories. I nd evidence that two key indicators
of local government policy (the municipal budget surplus/decit as a percentage
of total current revenues and the local income tax rate) exhibit a time pattern
that is compatible with a political budget cycle (larger decits and lower tax
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rates before the elections, followed by scal consolidation after the elections),
and that they exert a signicant impact on out-migration and in-migration ows
in a structural form model that uses the exogenous dates of staggered municipal
elections as instruments.
Overall, both the evidence based on monthly data around the three large
election waves of 2004, 2009, and 2014, and the one on the yearly panel dataset
point to the inuence of the electoral calendar on the timing of intermunicipal
sorting decisions, and to its usefulness in identifying Tiebout-like incentives
in migration decisions separately from conventional push and pull factors that
are unrelated to the demand for local public goods over which localities vote
periodically. In particular, the panel data evidence on the opportunistic use of
scal policy instruments by incumbents and their impact on moving decisions
suggests that the political budget cycle induced by the electoral schedule be the
most likely cause of the observed time pattern of sorting.
Indeed, the migration decision within a decentralised structure of govern-
ment is the product of a large number of considerations (Blomquist et al., 1988;
Day and Winer, 2006), and Tiebout-like incentives are likely to play di¤erent
roles in long versus short-distance movements (Biagi et al., 2011) or in tempo-
rary versus permanent migration (Fuchs-Schündeln and Schündeln, 2009). The
fact that neither of these issues can be addressed with the data that I have
employed here calls for future investigations of the impact of recurrent local
elections on migration based on micro-data. In addition, the evidence presented
in this paper arguably raises further potentially important issues for theoretical
and empirical research. An issue that seems worth of consideration concerns the
analysis of how distinct aspects of local public expenditures - e.g., the generos-
ity of housing subsidies, unemployment benets, and childcare services, versus
domiciliary assistance and health care programs - a¤ect the location choices
of groups of residents that may be characterised by di¤erent degrees of mo-
bility. This seems an important issue to address when studying how electoral
incentives shape the making of local policy and the resulting socio-economic
and demographic complexion of localities in a decentralised welfare provision
structure.
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Tables
Table 1 Schedule of Italian municipal elections
year
2002 733
2003 321
2004 4,317
2005 367
2006 1,161
2007 773
2008 425
2009 4,081
2010 461
2011 1,176
2012 777
2013 528
2014 3,677
Notes: Data from 6,702 municipalities located in the 15 regions of continental Italy.
Source: Ministero dellInterno, Governo Italiano (www.interno.gov.it).
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Table 2 Italian municipal elections: 2004, 2009, 2014
2004 2009 2014
election election election
yes no yes no yes no
municipalities 4,317 2,384 4,081 2,620 3,677 2,958
monthly out-migration rate (%) 0.26 0.23 0.26 0.23 0.28 0.26
monthly in-migration rate (%) 0.36 0.29 0.31 0.27 0.32 0.31
population 4,824 11,927 5,206 11,401 4,837 10,389
age < 18 (%) 15.48 17.08 15.54 16.27 15.48 15.86
age 18-25 (%) 8.33 9.23 7.64 8.48 7.40 8.17
age 26-35 (%) 14.63 14.74 13.31 13.51 11.31 11.84
age 36-45 (%) 15.09 14.94 15.99 15.60 15.33 15.04
age 46-55 (%) 13.29 12.96 13.61 13.47 15.11 14.95
age 56-65 (%) 12.02 11.39 12.18 11.76 13.08 12.75
age > 65 (%) 21.16 19.66 21.72 20.91 22.29 21.39
Notes: Source: ISTAT, Istituto Nazionale di Statistica (www.istat.it).
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Table 3 Monthly migration equation (1)
2004 2009 2014b 0.0298
(0.0060)
0.0179
(0.0055)
0.0133
(0.0052)b(a) 0.0279
(0.0060)
0.0171
(0.0055)
0.0132
(0.0052)
obs. 67,010 67,020 66,350
Notes: Panel data (within-groups) estimates of parameter  from equation (1); months=January
to October. (a) : equation (1) includes the size of municipal population on the rst day of
each month among the regressors. Standard errors clustered by municipality in parentheses.
: p-value < 0.01; : p-value < 0.05; : p-value < 0.10.
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Table 4 Monthly migration equation (1): electoral uncertainty
2004b 0.0299
(0.0060)
0.0294
(0.0061)
0.0310
(0.0062)
uncertainty(I)
-0.0142
(0.0362)
uncertainty(II)
0.0061
(0.0174)
uncertainty(III)
-0.0126
(0.0128)
2009b 0.0179
(0.0055)
0.0183
(0.0057)
0.0195
(0.0055)
0.0193
(0.0059)
0.0177
(0.0055)
uncertainty(I)
-0.0040
(0.0339)
uncertainty(II)
-0.0083
(0.0279)
uncertainty(III)
-0.0176
(0.0168)
uncertainty(IV)
-0.0041
(0.0087)
uncertainty(V)
0.0087
(0.0275)
2014b 0.0135
(0.0052)
0.0133
(0.0053)
0.0136
(0.0054)
0.0119
(0.0053)
0.0135
(0.0053)
uncertainty(I)
-0.0315
(0.0432)
uncertainty(II)
0.0002
(0.0152)
uncertainty(III)
-0.0032
(0.0126)
uncertainty(IV)
0.0069
(0.0111)
uncertainty(V)
-0.0034
(0.0136)
Notes: dependent variable = monthly migration rate (%); post-election dummy variable is
interacted with the following indicators: uncertainty(I): win margin in the upcoming election
is less than 0.3%; uncertainty(II): win margin in the upcoming election is less than 1.5%;
uncertainty(III): win margin in the upcoming election is less than 3%; uncertainty(IV): turnout
in previous election > 80%; uncertainty(V): win margin in previous Senate election (2008;
2013) is less than 1.5%. Standard errors clustered by municipality in parentheses. : p-
value < 0.01; : p-value < 0.05; : p-value < 0.10.
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Table 5 Monthly out-migration and in-migration (equation (1))
2004 2009 2014
out-migrationb 0.0286
(0.0039)
0.0266
(0.0036)
0.0201
(0.0036)
in-migrationb 0.0012
(0.0047)
-0.0088
(0.0044)
-0.0068
(0.0038)
obs. 67,010 67,020 66,350
Notes: Panel data (within-groups) estimates of parameter  from equation (1); months=January
to October. Standard errors clustered by municipality in parentheses. : p-value < 0.01;
: p-value < 0.05; : p-value < 0.10.
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Table 6 Monthly out-migration equation & uncertainty
2004b 0.0284
(0.0039)
0.0281
(0.0039)
0.0284
(0.0040)
uncertainty(I)
0.0103
(0.0255)
uncertainty(II)
0.0087
(0.0092)
uncertainty(III)
0.0019
(0.0072)
2009b 0.0267
(0.0036)
0.0264
(0.0036)
0.0267
(0.0036)
0.0259
(0.0039)
0.0263
(0.0036)
uncertainty(I)
-0.0066
(0.0231)
uncertainty(II)
0.0056
(0.0128)
uncertainty(III)
-0.0002
(0.0083)
uncertainty(IV)
0.0022
(0.0053)
uncertain(V)
0.0149
(0.0177)
2014b 0.0201
(0.0036)
0.0197
(0.0036)
0.0200
(0.0037)
0.0202
(0.0037)
0.0205
(0.0036)
uncertain(I)
0.0021
(0.0261)
uncertain(II)
0.0080
(0.0091)
uncertain(III)
0.0013
(0.0068)
uncertain(IV)
-0.0002
(0.0076)
uncertain(V)
-0.0049
(0.0117)
Notes: dependent variable = monthly out-migration rate (%); post-election dummy vari-
able is interacted with the following indicators: uncertainty(I): win margin in the upcoming
election is less than 0.3%; uncertainty(II): win margin in the upcoming election is less than
1.5%; uncertainty(III): win margin in the upcoming election is less than 3%; uncertainty(IV):
turnout in previous election > 80%; uncertainty(V): win margin in previous Senate election
(2008; 2013) is less than 1.5%. Standard errors clustered by municipality in parentheses. :
p-value < 0.01; : p-value < 0.05; : p-value < 0.10.
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Table 7 Monthly in-migration equation & uncertainty
2004b 0.0015
(0.0048)
0.0014
(0.0048)
0.0026
(0.0049)
uncertainty(I)
-0.0246
(0.0214)
uncertainty(II)
-0.0026
(0.0135)
uncertainty(III)
-0.0144
(0.0097)
2009b -0.0088
(0.0044)
-0.0081
(0.0042)
-0.0071
(0.0042)
-0.0065
(0.0045)
-0.0086
(0.0045)
uncertainty(I)
0.0025
(0.0236)
uncertainty(II)
-0.0139
(0.0355)
uncertainty(III)
-0.0174
(0.0196)
uncertainty(IV)
-0.0063
(0.0078)
uncertain(V)
-0.0062
(0.0184)
2014b -0.0065
(0.0038)
-0.0064
(0.0039)
-0.0064
(0.0040)
-0.0083
(0.0039)
-0.0069
(0.0039)
uncertainty(I)
-0.0337
(0.0465)
uncertainty(II)
-0.0078
(0.0132)
uncertainty(III)
-0.0045
(0.0085)
uncertainty(IV)
0.0072
(0.0086)
uncertainty(V)
0.0015
(0.0101)
Notes: dependent variable = monthly in-migration rate (%); post-election dummy variable
is interacted with the following indicators: uncertainty(I): win margin in the upcoming election
is less than 0.3%; uncertainty(II): win margin in the upcoming election is less than 1.5%;
uncertainty(III): win margin in the upcoming election is less than 3%; uncertainty(IV): turnout
in previous election > 80%; uncertainty(V): win margin in previous Senate election (2008;
2013) is less than 1.5%. Standard errors clustered by municipality in parentheses. : p-
value < 0.01; : p-value < 0.05; : p-value < 0.10.
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Table 8 Elections & migration: yearly panel data
out-migration
linear distance
0.0468
(0.0114)
election(t-1)
0.0321
(0.0076)
0.0365
(0.0082)
0.0373
(0.0089)
0.0177
(0.0109)
election(t-2)
0.0429
(0.0075)
0.0444
(0.0084)
0.0317
(0.0100)
election(t-3)
0.0095
(0.0087)
-0.0025
(0.0103)
election(t-4)
-0.0287
(0.0103)
in-migration
linear distance
-0.0596
(0.0146)
election(t-1)
-0.0687
(0.0092)
-0.0720
(0.0100)
-0.0721
(0.0115)
-0.0985
(0.0135)
election(t-2)
-0.0385
(0.0094)
-0.0339
(0.0110)
-0.0339
(0.0134)
election(t-3)
-0.0215
(0.0109)
-0.0144
(0.0131)
election(t-4)
-0.0002
(0.0132)
year e¤ects yes yes yes yes yes
municipal e¤ects yes yes yes yes yes
observations 60,252 80,357 73,656 66,954 60,252
Notes: dependent variable = out-migration/in-migration (January 1st to December 31st)
as a percentage of resident population (January 1st). Within-group estimates. Standard
errors clustered by municipality in parentheses. : p-value < 0.01; : p-value < 0.05; :
p-value < 0.10.
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Table 9 Fiscal policy & migration: IV estimation
out-migration in-migration
budget surplus
3.174
(1.459)
-3.309
(1.947)
income tax rate
4.730
(2.906)
-7.939
(3.875)
Sargan test (p value) 0.72 0.22
year e¤ects yes yes
municipal e¤ects yes yes
observations 27,656 27,656
Notes: dependent variable = yearly (out-migration; in-migration) rate (%); Instrumental
variables estimation; instruments: lagged election year dummies t-1, t-2, t-3, t-4; Standard
errors clustered by municipality in parentheses; : p-value < 0.01; : p-value < 0.05; :
p-value < 0.10.
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Figure 1 Elections and monthly migration rates (2004)
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Notes: Average di¤erence () in total monthly migration rates (in-migration+out-migration)
between municipalities holding mayoral elections () and municipalities not holding mayoral
elections () in 2004 (June, 12th).
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Figure 2 Elections and monthly migration rates (2009)
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Notes: Average di¤erence () in total monthly migration rates (in-migration+out-migration)
between municipalities holding mayoral elections () and municipalities not holding mayoral
elections () in 2009 (June, 7th).
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Figure 3 Elections and monthly migration rates (2014)
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Notes: Average di¤erence () in total monthly migration rates (in-migration+out-migration)
between municipalities holding mayoral elections () and municipalities not holding mayoral
elections () in 2014 (May, 25th).
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Figure 4 Elections and monthly out-migration rates (2004)
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Notes: Average di¤erence () in monthly out-migration rates between municipalities
holding mayoral elections () and municipalities not holding mayoral elections () in 2004
(June, 12th).
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Figure 5 Elections and monthly out-migration rates (2009)
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Notes: Average di¤erence () in monthly out-migration rates between municipalities
holding mayoral elections () and municipalities not holding mayoral elections () in 2009
(June, 7th).
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Figure 6 Elections and monthly out-migration rates (2014)
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Notes: Average di¤erence () in monthly out-migration rates between municipalities
holding mayoral elections () and municipalities not holding mayoral elections () in 2014
(May, 25th).
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Figure 7 Elections and monthly in-migration rates (2004)
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Notes: Average di¤erence () in monthly in-migration rates between municipalities hold-
ing mayoral elections () and municipalities not holding mayoral elections () in 2004 (June,
12th).
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Figure 8 Elections and monthly in-migration rates (2009)
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Notes: Average di¤erence () in monthly in-migration rates between municipalities hold-
ing mayoral elections () and municipalities not holding mayoral elections () in 2009 (June,
7th).
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Figure 9 Elections and monthly in-migration rates (2014)
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Notes: Average di¤erence () in monthly in-migration rates between municipalities hold-
ing mayoral elections () and municipalities not holding mayoral elections () in 2014 (May,
25th).
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Figure 10 The electoral migration cycle: out-migration & in-migration rates
t
+3+1 +2 +4
(e
le
ct
io
n)
(e
le
ct
io
n)
0.025
out-migration
t
+3+1 +2 +4
(e
le
ct
io
n)
(e
le
ct
io
n)
-0.075
in-migration
Notes: estimated impact of the timing of municipal elections on annual out-migration
rates and in-migration rates in each of the four years between two elections [estimates from
table 8, last column; 60,252 observations (2002-2014)]; dashed lines: 95% condence interval.
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Figure 11 The political budget cycle: budget surplus & local income tax rate
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Notes: estimated impact of the timing of municipal elections on the budget surplus/decit
as a percentage of total revenues and on the local income tax rate set by municipalities in
each of the four years between two elections (years 2006-2014); dashed lines: 95% condence
interval.
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Appendix A Robustness check results
Length of the electoral cycle
As far as the election round of 2009 is concerned, 4,007 out of the 4,081 authori-
ties holding elections had the previous election exactly ve years earlier, in 2004,
thus following a regular election cycle. As for 2014, 3,672 of the 3,677 authorities
had the previous election in 2009, while I do not have complete information on
earlier elections than the 2004 one. I report the estimates of coe¢ cient  from
equation (1) for the observations having regular electoral cycles in the years
2009 and 2014 in table A.1 below.
Table A.1 Sensitivity analysis: regular ve-years terms only
2009 2014b 0.0187
(0.0055)
0.0133
(0.0052)
obs. 66,280 66,300
Notes: dependent variable = monthly migration rate (%). Month and municipality xed
e¤ects included. Standard errors clustered by municipality in parentheses. : p-value <
0.01; : p-value < 0.05; : p-value < 0.10.
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Observation window around the election
Table A.2 reports the results of estimation of coe¢ cient  from equation (1)
when using observations from 2 months (May-June) to 8 months (February-
September) around the date of each of the three elections. Table A.3 reports the
results of estimation of the same specications using the alternative treatment
group represented by the authorities having elections in the years 2003, 2008,
and 2013.
Table A.2 Sensitivity analysis: alternative time-windows
2004 2009 2014b
[May-Jun]
0.0146
(0.0124)
0.0358
(0.0109)
0.0571
(0.0112)
obs. 13,402 13,404 13,270b
[Apr-Jul]
0.0403
(0.0092)
0.0312
(0.0083)
0.0410
(0.0084)
obs. 26,804 26,808 26,540b
[Mar-Aug]
0.0395
(0.0077)
0.0237
(0.0070)
0.0256
(0.0066)
obs. 40,206 40,212 39,810b
[Feb-Sep]
0.0333
(0.0068)
0.0157
(0.0060)
0.0169
(0.0059)
obs. 53,608 53,616 53,080
Notes: dependent variable = monthly migration rate (%). Month and municipality xed
e¤ects included. Standard errors clustered by municipality in parentheses. : p-value <
0.01; : p-value < 0.05; : p-value < 0.10.
53
Table A.3 Sensitivity analysis: alternative time-windows & treatment group
2003 2008 2013b
[2 months]
0.0635
(0.0365)
0.0802
(0.0234)
0.0809
(0.0277)
obs. 4,764 5,242 6,044b
[4 months]
0.0744
(0.0227)
0.0616
(0.0160)
0.0843
(0.0229)
obs. 9,528 10,484 12,088b
[6 months]
0.0277
(0.0189)
0.0228
(0.0148)
0.0527
(0.0208)
obs. 14,292 15,726 18,132b
[8 months]
0.0102
(0.0158)
0.0150
(0.0126)
0.0293
(0.0174)
obs. 19,056 20,968 24,176
Notes: dependent variable = monthly migration rate (%). Month and municipality xed
e¤ects included. Standard errors clustered by municipality in parentheses. : p-value <
0.01; : p-value < 0.05; : p-value < 0.10.
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